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Concentration risk and the optimal number 
of central counterparties for a single asset
We model the central counterparty (CCP) clearing of a single asset traded over-the-counter by two groups 
of banks in two currencies. We compare a variety of different clearing set-ups involving one or two CCPs 
according to their ability to withstand a combined market and banking crisis. Using stress testing, the model 
shows that the question of the optimal clearing set-up for a speciﬁ  c asset is complex and depends on 
many parameters such as the level of funding available to the CCP(s), the degree of integration between 
the different groups of participants and the particular risk proﬁ  les of these different groups.
On the whole, however, a single CCP solution appears less resilient than a two-CCP arrangement when the 
magnitude of the crisis is large and only more resilient when the magnitude of the crisis is small in relation 
to the clearing fund of the CCP(s). Another interesting outcome is that the two-CCP set-ups perform better 
than the single CCP set-up for low levels of participation. 
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T
he recent crisis has shown the need to improve 
risk controls for OTC credit derivatives and 
several authorities have expressed strong 
support for CCP (central counterparty) clearing of 
OTC credit derivatives (McCreevy, 2008, FRBNY, 
2008, US Treasury, 2009). As the market is moving 
forward in this direction, the debate has now shifted 
to the question of the most appropriate market 
set-up for the clearing of OTC credit derivatives, in 
particular the number and location of CCPs dedicated 
to this task. 
Despite its crucial importance, the question as to the 
most appropriate set-up for the clearing of a given 
asset has not yet been extensively researched by 
academics and central bankers. A ﬁ  rst quantitative 
contribution by Jackson and Manning (2007) showed 
that CCP clearing can offer signiﬁ  cant risk mitigation 
when compared with bilateral arrangements. Another 
paper, from Dufﬁ  e and Zhu (2009), investigates the 
issue of the optimal number of CCPs for a given 
asset. They found that whenever it is efﬁ  cient – in 
terms of netting efﬁ  ciency – to introduce a CCP, it 
cannot be efﬁ  cient to introduce more than one CCP 
for the same asset. 
However, when assessing the suitability of 
a single CCP solution as against a two-CCP set-up, 
it is important to take into account not only the 
maximum netting ratio achieved by the single CCP 
solution, but also the concentration of risk in a single 
infrastructure that this solution entails. For this 
reason, in this paper we use different metrics than 
those used in Dufﬁ  e and Zhu (2009). Instead of 
looking at the netting efﬁ  ciency, we perform a 
series of stress tests and consider that the most 
resilient set-up will be the most appropriate one. 
The stress tests consist in simulating the outcome 
of a crisis that would result in the simultaneous 
default of several banks together with a sharp 
variation in the cleared asset price, hence leading 
to some replacement costs for the CCPs. Should 
the losses incurred by a CCP exceed its clearing 
fund, the CCP will default, strongly affecting the 
smooth settlement of all trades cleared by the 
defaulting CCP. The metrics we use to compare 
and assess the different clearing set-ups is the 
expected average value of the trades cleared by a 
CCP that has defaulted. 
This paper focuses exclusively on a comparison 
between a single CCP solution and a two-CCP set-up. 
A realistic comparison between bilateral clearing 
and CCP clearing calls for careful modelling of the 
domino effect that could be triggered by the default 
of a single bank in the bilateral clearing scenario, 
and would require a more complicated model. In 
order to take into account the potentially different 
risk proﬁ  les of the participants, we model a world 
divided in two zones with distinct currencies and 
populated by distinct sets of banks and we allow for 
the possibility that the two zones are affected by the 
crisis to different degrees. We study different set-ups 
for the clearing of a single global product over these 
two zones, taking into account the fact that banks 
can trade in both currencies and with banks from 
the other zone. 
1| MODELLING CCPS’ DYNAMICS
  DURING FINANCIAL TURMOIL
1|1  Designing the ﬁ  nancial 
environment
We model a world divided in two zones, which we 
will call respectively America and Europe for the 
sake of convenience. Each zone is characterised by 
its respective currency – dollar or USD for America 
and euro or EUR for Europe – and by its set of 
domestic banks that we will call American and 
European banks respectively. Both European and 
American banks engage in OTC trading activities 
on a given single asset or product (CDS in this 
paper). The banks are free to trade with banks 
that belong to their own zone or with banks that 
belong to the other zone. We will refer to these trades 
as domestic and cross-zone trades respectively. 
All types of trades – domestic European, 
domestic American and cross-zone trades – 
can be made in either of the two currencies. For 
example, two European banks can trade the asset 
with each other for dollars or euro. 
The model includes one or two CCPs that clear the 
OTC trades concluded between the banks. All trades 
FSR14_RENAULT.indd   170 FSR14_RENAULT.indd   170 13/07/2010   09:17:16 13/07/2010   09:17:16ARTICLES
Fabien Renault: “Concentration risk and the optimal number of central counterparties for a single asset”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  171
are cleared by a CCP, meaning that we do not allow 
for the possibility of bilateral clearing. We assume 
that the CCPs do not face principal risk, which is 
reasonable nowadays thanks to the development 
of delivery-versus-payment arrangements. CCPs 
in Europe and the US typically have three lines of 
defence to protect themselves against the default of 
a participant: margins called from the participants; 
a clearing fund; and the CCP’s own assets. In the 
model, we ignore the third line of defence, or rather 
consider that the CCP’s assets can be merged into its 
clearing fund. We thus assume that all CCPs rely on 
both a clearing fund and on margins posted by the 
participants (taken in the model as proportional to 
the absolute value of the net position of participants 
with regard to the asset). 
1|2  Different clearing set-ups
When more than a single CCP is involved, the 
organisation of the clearing can take diverse forms, 
depending on the transactions cleared by each CCP. 
We do not model competition between CCPs here, 
and the perimeter of each CCP is taken as exogenous. 
Here are the different set-ups that were considered:
￿  The single CCP model (Set-up 1).  There is 
only one CCP, called CCPg, in which all European 
and American banks participate directly. This single 
global CCP clears all trades irrespective of the nature 
(American domestic, European domestic, or cross-zone) 
and of the currency of the trade (see Figure 1).
￿  Two-CCP model with a clearing link between 
CCPe and CCPa (Set-up 2). There are two CCPs, 
one American, called CCPa, in which only American 
banks participate, and one European, called CCPe, in 
which only European banks participate. CCPa clears 
all American domestic trades (both EUR and USD) 
while CCPe clears all domestic European trades (both 
EUR and USD). Cross-zone trades (both EUR and 
USD) are cleared through a bilateral clearing link 
established between CCPe and CCPa (see Figure 2).
￿  Two-CCP model with a link between CCPe and 
CCPa cleared through a CCP of CCPs (Set-up 3). 
Same as Set-up 2 except that cross-zone trades (both 
EUR and USD) are cleared through CCPe and CCPa’s 
common participation in CCPc, a CCP for CCPs 
(see Figure 3).
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￿  Two regional CCPs clearing their respective 
currencies (Set-up 4). All banks participate both in 
CCPa (which clears all trades denominated in USD) 
and in CCPe (which clears all trades denominated in 
EUR) (see Figure 4).
￿  Two regional CCPs clearing their respective 
currencies, with a risk management agreement in 
place between the two CCPs (Set-up 5). Same as 
Set-up 4, with a risk management agreement in place 
between the two CCPs. The risk management agreement 
includes cross-margining and possible transfer of 
positions of defaulting participants (see Figure 5).
The ability of the different aforementioned set-ups to 
withstand a crisis is investigated in the following section. 
CCP guarantee funds were chosen so as to ensure 
compliance with CPSS-IOSCO (Committee on Payment 
and Settlement Systems and International Organization 
of Securities Commissions) Recommendation 5 for 
Central Counterparties (BIS, 2004) which requires CCPs 
to “maintain sufﬁ  cient ﬁ  nancial resources to withstand, 
at a minimum, a default by the participant to which it 
has the largest exposure in extreme but plausible market 
conditions.” In order to allow for a fair and meaningful 
comparison between the different set-ups, the total 
amount of cash immobilised (margins + guarantee 
funds) is always the same in all set-ups. Thus in the 
two-CCP set-up, the sum of the guarantee fund of the 
two CCPs is equal to the guarantee fund of the single 
CCP in the single CCP arrangement. 
Figure 3
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1 www.octave.org 
2| TESTING THE RESILIENCE 
  OF THE DIFFERENT 
  CLEARING SET-UPS
2|1  Crisis model and testing metrics
As CCPs only face replacement cost risk in the model, 
they are only vulnerable to a participant’s default 
simultaneous with a large market movement. Thus, 
the model includes both a market crisis, represented as 
a large and sudden drop in the asset price, and a banking 
crisis, represented as the simultaneous failures of 
several banks. The bank defaults are modelled by 
giving each bank a certain probability of default, which 
leads to a random number of defaults, rather than 
by imposing a certain number of defaults. Such an 
approach was thought to more realistically capture the 
nature of global crises. For example, with 100 banks 
in each zone, imposing a 3% default probability for all 
banks in both zones can lead to 3 defaults in each zone 
(with a probability of 5%) or to 1 default in one zone 
and 4 in the other zone (with a probability of 2.5%). 
The two zones having the same risk proﬁ  le only means 
that the average expected number of defaults will be 
the same in both zones, not that the actual realisation of 
the crisis will be systematically the same in both zones. 
The bank defaults will lead to losses for the CCPs, 
which will be covered by the margins posted by the 
defaulting banks and by the CCPs’ clearing fund. A CCP 
is considered as defaulting when its clearing fund is 
unable to cover all of its losses. A series of simulations 
were performed using an OCTAVE1 implementation 
of the model described, with the objective of trying 
to assess the previously presented clearing set-ups. 
The impact of the crisis is characterised by the total 
value of affected trades. A given trade is considered 
“affected” if and only if the CCP clearing this trade 
has defaulted, regardless of the possible default of 
the two banks at the origin of the trade.
2|1  The model’s ﬁ  ndings
The relative performance of the set-ups will depend 
on the topology of the cleared transactions (including 
the number of participating banks, the number of 
transactions, the degree of integration between the 
two zones, the proportion of transactions that are 
concluded in the home currency), on the level of 
margins and guarantee fund of the CCPs, and on the 
type and magnitude of the crisis (which can affect 
only one of the two zones or both, and can be severe 
or mild). Each of these parameters was varied away 
from a base case in order to investigate the effects at 
work. Despite the model’s limitations, it yields the 
following ﬁ  ndings.
The ﬁ  rst ﬁ  nding is that a two-CCP solution is more 
resilient than a single CCP when the magnitude of the 
crisis is large. This effect is greatest when the crisis 
affects only one of the two zones. Basically, a single 
CCP allows for the mutualisation of the losses between 
the two zones, which is effective in weathering mild 
local crises but allows the propagation of local crises 
from one zone to the other. 
The second ﬁ  nding is that a two-CCP solution appears 
all the more appropriate when the degree of integration 
between the two zones considered is moderate. When 
there is a low level of integration between the two 
zones, a two-CCP solution allows for perfect insulation 
of the two zones, and thus provides a very high level 
of resilience against severe local crises.
The third ﬁ  nding is that the level of participation 
has a complex effect on the resilience of CCPs. All 
other things being equal, increasing the number of 
participants decreases the uncertainty of the outcome. 
This tends to make the situation better or worse 
depending on the existing balance between the level 
of funding of the CCP(s) and the magnitude of the 
crisis. An interesting and to some extent unexpected 
outcome is that a high level of participation does not 
favour the two-CCP set-ups compared to the one-CCP 
set-up. On the contrary, two-CCP set-ups perform 
better than the single CCP set-up for low levels of 
participation.
The fourth ﬁ  nding is that when more than one CCP is 
involved, the organisation of the clearing between the 
different CCPs plays an important role. In particular, 
the existence of risk management agreements 
between the CCPs (such as cross-margining and the 
transfer of the position of the defaulting participants) 
is shown to greatly increase their resilience.
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2|3  Assessing clearing resilience 
empirically
In addition, we make an initial attempt to apply the 
model to the clearing of credit derivatives. To do 
so, we select a sample of major US and European 
credit derivatives dealers2 and use public data from 
banks’ ﬁ  nancial statements and supervisory reports 
(Ofﬁ  ce of the Comptroller of the Currency’s quarterly 
report3 on bank trading and derivatives activities).
Regarding the clearing of credit derivatives, Set-ups 4 and 
5 (two regional CCPs each clearing their own currency) 
are probably the most appropriate two-CCP set-ups 
since they would allow access to central bank money 
for each of the two CCPs. As Set-up 5 combines some 
interesting features of the single CCP set-up and of the 
two-CCP arrangement, it was the chosen set-up for this 
investigation. Figure 6 presents a comparison between 
2  We consider banks whose notional amount of traded credit derivatives is above USD 1,000 billion. We obtain the following sample of American banks: JPMorgan, 
Bank of America, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup; of European banks: Deutsche bank, Barclays, BNPP, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole, HSBC.
3  The OCC report is available at www.occ.treas.gov/deriv/deriv.htm.
Set-up 5 and Set-up 1 (the single-CCP set-up). The x-axis 
corresponds to the magnitude of the banking crisis in the 
American zone and the y-axis to the magnitude of the 
banking crisis in the European zone. Each cell results 
from the averaging of 10,000 simulations performed, and 
the colour of the cell provides the average difference 
between the observed fraction of trades affected by 
the crisis in set-up 5 and in set-up 1. According to the 
chosen colour scale, a dark blue to light green colour 
corresponds to crisis parameters for which set-up 1 is 
more resilient (fewer affected trades), while a white to 
dark red colour corresponds to crisis parameters for 
which set-up 1 is less resilient (more affected trades). 
Figure 6 clearly shows that a two-CCP set-up would 
be more resilient than a single CCP arrangement for 
severe crises. Using these real data, it conﬁ  rms that 
a single CCP set-up might not be the most appropriate 
solution in terms of ﬁ  nancial stability. However, this 
warrants being validated by further research using real 
trade-by-trade data. 
Figure 6
Compared impact of the crisis in Set-ups 5 and 1
Impact of the crisis in Set-up 5 minus impact of the crisis in Set-up 1
3,5
0,4
0,3 A dark blue to light green colour 
indicates a situation in which 
Set-up 1 (single CCP) 
performs better than Set-up 5 
(two regional CCPs clearing 
their own currencies).
A white to dark red colour 
indicates a situation in which 
Set-up 5 (two regional CCPs 
clearing their own currency) 
















0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5
Lambda_A (average number of defaulting American banks)
Lambda_E (average number of defaulting European banks)
FSR14_RENAULT.indd   174 FSR14_RENAULT.indd   174 13/07/2010   09:17:17 13/07/2010   09:17:17ARTICLES
Fabien Renault: “Concentration risk and the optimal number of central counterparties for a single asset”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  175
The model shows that the question of the optimal number of CCPs for a speciﬁ  c market is extremely 
complex and depends on many parameters such as the level of funding available to the CCP(s), the degree 
of integration between the different zones that make up the market and the particular risk proﬁ  les of these 
different zones. In particular, the likelihood of a severe local crisis is of prime importance.
There is therefore no general answer to the question as to the optimal number of CCPs for a speciﬁ  c market 
and only a case-by-case detailed analysis could provide some insight into the most efﬁ  cient solution to 
be implemented. This would require a more comprehensive assessment using real net exposures data on 
all types of products. Furthermore, risks other than credit risk should be taken into account. For example, 
a global CCP clearing multiple currencies will typically rely on one or several commercial settlement banks 
to operate. Thus it would face higher settlement bank risk than a CCP operating in a single currency that 
uses the central bank as settlement agent. More generally, swift access to central bank money has proven 
to be extremely important for CCPs in times of crisis. 
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